Tweeting for democracy: Comparative analysis of British and Dutch tweets targeted at democracies and non-democracies by Okcuoglu, Helin
	
							
Tweeting for Democracy  
Comparative analysis of British and Dutch tweets targeted at democracies and 
non-democracies 					 				 						
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s Thesis 
Hêlin Okçuoğlu  				
TWEETING FOR DEMOCRACY  1 
 
 
 
 
 
Tweeting for Democracy 
Comparative analysis of British and Dutch tweets targeted at democracies and 
non-democracies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s Thesis 
Hêlin Okçuoğlu  
s1403281 
 
 
 
BSc Politicologie: Internationale Betrekkingen en Organisaties 
Leiden University 
 
Instructor: 
Dr. Rebekkah Tromble  
 
09.06.2016 
TWEETING FOR DEMOCRACY  2 
Abstract 
When explaining the effects of social media like Twitter for diplomatic purposes, the 
current literature mostly focuses on the use of online strategies by government actors. 
In this way, numerous scholars have discovered which diplomatic strategies work best 
for government actors when trying to reach foreign countries. However, those studies 
do not go deeper into explaining how these online strategies might differ based on the 
aspects of the target country. This study aims to shift the focus of the existing 
literature; instead of exploring the impact of a country’s online social media use on a 
foreign public, this research will examine whether the regime structure of a foreign 
target country influences a government’s online diplomatic strategy. In order to do so, 
this study examines whether democracies might be more cautious in their digital 
diplomatic strategies towards non-democracies than towards democracies. In two 
separate Chi-Square Tests, the tweets of the Twitter accounts of various diplomatic 
actors, hailing from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, will be analyzed. The 
findings show that the theory outlined in the literature review does not apply to the 
practice; diplomatic actors actually generate more controversial tweets targeting non-
democracies than targeting democracies. An additional qualitative analysis explains 
that this is because of the phenomenon of ‘democracy promotion’. Scholars claim that 
democracies are overall eager to promote the democratic system and its values and 
thus find there is more need of controversy in their message targeting a non-
democracy than targeting a democracy. 
 
Keywords: democracy, non-democracy, digital diplomacy, Twitter, target country, 
regime structure 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past years, Twitter has become the indispensable social medium upon which 
a virtual diplomatic network is based (Hocking & Melissen, 2015). This virtual 
diplomatic network includes diplomatic actors, as well as non-official groups, 
organizations and individuals congregating online (Melissen, 2005, p. 5). Because of 
the increase in the variety of actors now engaging in the practice of digital diplomacy, 
governments are slowly losing the monopoly of information they once enjoyed 
(Nweke, 2012, p. 24). In order to filter the extreme amount of information exposed to 
the public in this time of digitalization, government actors have entered into dialogue 
with the public via social media accounts such as Twitter. As of today, this new 
phenomenon has been scrutinized by numerous scholars who claim that Twitter is 
particularly well-known for being a new instrument through which public diplomacy 
is being practiced (Fletcher, 2011; Lakomy, 2014; Romero, 2014). 
  Today’s existing research in the realm of digital diplomacy has mainly 
focused on the potential of social media to reshape and innovate the practice of public 
diplomacy (Åström, Karlsson, Linde & Pirannejad, 2012; Bjola and Holmes, 2015; 
Nweke, 2012; Strauß, Kruikemeier, Van der Meulen & Van Noort, 2015; Su and Xu, 
2015). For example, scholars have evaluated the impact of a country’s social media 
use for diplomatic purposes and explored how state actors could benefit from it. By 
doing so, scholars have discovered which diplomatic strategy works best when trying 
to reach foreign countries. Yet, the target country itself may also prove to play a 
relevant role in how countries deliver their message and more importantly, in what 
type of information this message contains. Only a few studies to date confirm that 
countries might adapt their diplomatic strategies to the audience they target (Leonard, 
2002; Potter, 2002). A reason for this might be that digital diplomacy research 
primarily focus on explaining the effects of social media for diplomatic purposes and 
the effects that a country’s social media use has on the public. By examining this, 
many scholars succeed mainly in explaining how well an online strategy fits a 
country’s online profile. Moreover, those researches mostly offer extensive 
knowledge solely on digital diplomacy between Western countries, so there is limited 
research available on online diplomatic messages targeted at non-democratic 
audiences. Altogether, current studies lack information on the target country itself as a 
possible factor which might greatly influence a country’s online diplomatic strategy.  
In an attempt to complete this apparent absence, the following research question has 
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been developed: Does the state structure of a target country influence the digital 
diplomatic strategies that government actors conduct through Twitter? Do online 
diplomatic strategies differ when targeting different audiences, how might the 
messages created by government actors differ when targeting different audiences and 
ultimately, why might they differ? This study aims to address these questions by 
shifting the current focus of the existing literature. Instead of exploring the impact of 
a country’s online social media use on a foreign public, this research will scrutinize 
whether the aspects of a foreign target country influence a government’s online 
diplomatic strategy. In order to do so, I will explore the difference in online 
diplomatic strategies when targeting various audiences. I will examine whether 
democracies might be more cautious in their digital diplomatic strategies towards 
non-democracies than towards democracies. For the comparative analysis, I will 
examine the tweets of diplomatic actors from two democracies: a global power, the 
United Kingdom, and a smaller power, the Netherlands. For each case separately, I 
will explore the difference between their online diplomatic strategies targeted at a 
democracy, Canada, and a non-democracy, China. Both the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands have active foreign policies for the two targeted countries. 
 This study begins with a clarification of some of the most important terms for 
this research and an outline of earlier explanations on the impact of digital diplomacy. 
This is followed up by a review on the difference in targeted countries and possibly, 
the difference in online diplomatic strategies conducted upon them. Afterwards, the 
methods that I have used to collect and code the data are explained in detail, followed 
by a description of the various statistical techniques that I have used to analyze the 
quantitative data. The findings are presented afterwards and in the end, these findings 
are briefly explained by means of a qualitative research, forming a conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. From Soft Power to Digital Diplomacy 
Because of the extension of globalization after the Cold War, the use of soft power 
became more popular among states than the use of hard power (Cha, Yeo & Kim, 
2014, p. 175). In Nye’s definition (1990, p. 156), soft power is the ability of states to 
shape the preferences of other states through appeal and attraction, rather than 
coercion. According to Sun (2008, p. 166) nation-branding, exchanging mutual 
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interests, lobbying and communication strategies are all kinds of actions that states 
use to appeal and attract others’ preferences. Nowadays, states are also entering into 
dialogue with the public due to new resources of soft power. In order to mobilize 
those new resources, governments make use of public diplomacy. Nye (2008, p. 95) 
defines public diplomacy as an instrument that governments use not only to 
communicate with the public of other countries, but also to attract them. Several 
countries had introduced the concept of public diplomacy already in World War I, in 
order to convince other countries’ public of ideological support (Cha et al., 2014, p. 
175). The characteristics of a country like culture, political values and foreign policy 
have become important dimensions in public diplomacy (Nye, 2004). As of today, an 
attempt at public diplomacy is an “attempt to reach publics and influence public 
opinion” (Henrikson, 2006, p. 1). However, a new form of public diplomacy has 
occurred lately, mainly referred to by scholars as ‘digital diplomacy’ (Bjola and 
Holmes, 2015; Hocking and Melissen, 2015; Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015; Ritto, 
2014; Westcott, 2008). In their book, Bjola and Holmes (2015, p. 35) define digital 
diplomacy as a “strategy of managing change through digital tools and virtual 
collaborations”. Most scholars are positive about this digitalization, stating that it has 
made the practice of diplomacy more efficient and cost-effective, towards openness 
and transparency (Ritto, 2014). Some others are more skeptical, claiming that these 
new technologies undermine the nature of diplomacy by threatening the traditional 
roles and instructions of it (Gregory, 2014, p. 11). However, these differing 
conclusions can not deny the fact that the practice of diplomacy has endured major 
changes in the past few years, with new available technologies making way for states 
to digitally reach out to citizens world-wide (Lichtenstein, 2010). Previous research 
has come to find that this revolution has now introduced the public as integral part to 
public diplomacy (Cha et al., 2014; Kampf et al., 2015; Su & Xu, 2015). Digital 
platforms like social media allow governments to enter into active dialogue with this 
public. A platform that has especially been useful to governments is the online 
microblog Twitter.  
2.2. Twitter 
As mentioned in the introduction, the social medium Twitter has become an 
indispensable digital instrument for public diplomacy (Hocking & Melissen, 2015, p. 
9). Scholars have introduced ‘Twiplomacy’ in their research as a term for Twitter 
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being a digital diplomatic tool of communication (Fletcher, 2011; Lakomy, 2014; 
Romero, 2014; Su & Xu, 2015). These Twiplomacy studies claim that Twitter as one 
of many social media has given the public an open access to public diplomacy. Some 
scholars refer to this as ‘two-way communication’ (Payne, Sevin & Bruya, 2011). 
Twitter works in such way that any individual with or without a Twitter account can 
read the messages that government actors publicly tweet. The ones who do have a 
Twitter account can also respond to those tweets and therefore, scholars suggest, can 
engage in public diplomacy. Accordingly, former research gives the expectation that 
Twitter is a tool which successfully integrates the public into diplomacy.  
 However, when exploring the success of dialogues with the public in digital 
diplomatic practices, most studies tend to focus on the government actors still. They 
either look at how state actors could benefit from it (Romero, 2014; Todorovska, 
2015), or which ways would be the best for state actors to communicate with the 
public online (Khatib, Dutton & Thelwall, 2012). For instance, Todorovska (2015, p. 
33), examined that the new available communication technologies have given 
government actors a wider reach for promoting their public diplomatic objectives. She 
then claims that “it generates positive outcomes in terms of engaging with foreign 
audiences” (2015, p. 35). Bjola and Holmes (2015, p. 72) also evaluate digital ways in 
which states could exert their influence successfully. On the other hand, Khatib et al. 
(2012) examine different digital platforms which, in their case, empower the US 
government to engage directly with citizens in the Middle East. They claim that 
government actors with an online presence require “strategic thinking about how to 
implement and use these new communication technologies” (2012, p. 471). Other 
studies also express the need of having an online presence for government actors in 
order to matter in the digital world of diplomacy (Leonard, 2002). Because, as 
Leonard (2002, p. 50) underlines, diplomatic actors should have control “over the way 
media present their countries”. Or they argue that diplomatic actors are best in 
understanding how information should be presented in relation to their country’s 
policies and objectives (Cha et al., 2014; Nweke, 2012, p. 24). In the realm of digital 
diplomacy studies, many more scholars did an attempt to explore online diplomatic 
strategies from the angle of the government actor itself (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 
71). For example, Bjola and Holmes (2015, p. 72), observed the effects of social 
media for diplomatic purposes. Another example is the study of Hocking and 
Melissen (2015, p. 53), who claim that “the digital age influences governments in 
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terms of more effective top-down delivery of services”. Those scholars only focus on 
the impact that the digitalization of public diplomacy has on government actors. 
 The conclusions which the scholars mentioned above draw from their studies all 
indicate a top-down approach, explaining why and how government actors could 
influence or should influence a foreign audience, in order to conduct digital 
diplomatic strategies successfully. Most scholars have not done further research to 
explain why and how government’s conducted digital strategies might eventually 
differ, based on aspects of the targeted country. Therefore, it is safe to say that in the 
light of the new area of digital diplomacy, current literature lacks research on ways in 
which the foreign target country might have an influence on the digital diplomatic 
strategies of government actors. More specifically, little is understood about how the 
regime structure of a target country could play an important role in explaining the 
difference in government’s strategies when targeting distinctive foreign audiences 
digitally. As Potter (2002, p. 3) confirms, it is a requirement for governments to strive 
to understand every aspect of the country in which their target audience lives, in order 
for public diplomacy to succeed. Ross (2003, p. 27) agrees, stating that governments 
are responsible for understanding their targeted countries to be able to genuinely 
commit to dialogues with its corresponding audience. Although a few public 
diplomacy scholars do mention that social media could be used for exerting influence 
from both the angle of government actor and the angle of target country (Romero, 
2014, p. 2), they do not go deeper into explaining the impact that a regime structure of 
a target country might have on the online strategies conducted upon its public. This 
will be justified further in the next section. 
2.3. A New Perspective 
Instead of scrutinizing how government actors make use of Twitter as a digital 
diplomacy tool to influence a foreign target country, this study seeks to explore how 
the regime structure of a target country	 may have an impact on a government’s 
strategic use of Twitter. Firstly, Twiplomacy scholars generally agree that the targeted 
country has been given the possibility for active engagement into the practices of 
public diplomacy (Strauß et al., 2015; Su & Xu, 2015). This indicates that 
government actors must bear in mind the aspects of the audience they are targeting, 
like the country in which they live. Secondly, in the research of Hocking and 
Melissen (2015) on digital diplomatic practices, they have come to find that state’s 
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foreign policy agendas change in the shift from offline public diplomacy to online 
public diplomacy. They state that the change in character of the policy agenda is 
reinforced by the dynamics of the targeted countries (Hocking & Melissen, 2015, p. 
22). Holmes (2013) elaborates on this, stating that digital diplomacy requires adapted 
strategies and Leonard (2002, p. 56) agrees, stating that the strategy must also 
correspond with the grain of a target country’s regime. Unfortunately, they elaborate 
on their arguments by only looking at how diplomatic actors should apply their skills 
to adapt their strategies for online foreign policy. Hocking and Melissen (2015), 
Holmes (2013) and Leonard (2002) agree that governments should bear in mind the 
audience they target when developing online strategies, but they put no effort into 
looking at how the aspects of the country of an online target audience might also play 
a role in developing online strategies. As of today, most studies in the realm of digital 
diplomacy have been focused on ways in which state actors could or should influence 
a foreign audience by means of social media. However, apart from mentioning that 
there are no ‘one size fits all’ digital strategies (Hocking & Melissen, 2015, p. 30), 
minimum research has been done to further explain how their digital strategies 
eventually might differ. The claims of the researches mentioned in this section 
confirm the expectation that a target country’s regime structure might have an 
influence on government’s digital diplomacy strategies. This generates the suggestion 
that there is a gap in the current literature. Some scholars do mention that 
governments might apply different online diplomatic strategies when targeting 
distinctive audiences. However, no efforts have been made to further explore what 
kind of role the regime structure of the targeted country plays in this. More 
importantly, as most of the research cover Western democracies, minimum research 
has been done to explore online diplomatic strategies targeted at non-democracies. 
This will be justified in the next section.  
2.4. Target Audiences from Different Political Regime Types  
Now that there are reasons to believe that the target country might also have ways of 
influencing the diplomatic strategies conducted upon them digitally, what type of 
influence would that be, and which factors does it depend on? In their book, Bjola and 
Holmes (2015) have done research on the effectiveness of social media for diplomatic 
purposes. They have examined what kind of digital strategies democratic countries 
use when exerting influence on the audience in a non-democracy. Accordingly, Bjola 
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and Holmes (2015, p. 87) came to the conclusion that “the more estranged the 
relationship between two countries, the more cautious the digital diplomatic strategy”. 
The authors thus imply that democracies might generate less controversial tweets 
when targeting an audience from a distinct regime type. To support this argument, 
they claim that the type of relationship two countries have might influence the digital 
strategies they conduct upon each other’s audience (2015, p. 87). Or as Bjola and 
Holmes (2015, p. 87) more specifically state, “the nature of the bilateral relationship 
between countries influences the way in which social media is being used for 
diplomatic purposes”. In order to examine this statement and discover the inner 
workings of this reasoning, I involved studies on international relations, diplomatic 
relations and foreign policy literature outlining behavioral explanations.  
 In his research on friendships and rivalries in world politics, Bjola (2012) 
focuses on diplomacy’s origins, seeking answers as to why relations between 
democracies are better established than relations between a democracy and a non-
democracy. Bjola (2012, p. 14) comes to find that countries usually start developing 
good relations when they share the success of their collaboration. Great factors of 
good collaboration are shared beliefs, desires and intentions (Searle, 1995). Another 
important factor is the need for trust-building activities to support and promote joint 
policy goals (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 22; Melissen, 2005; Ross, 2003). Lastly, 
shared culture could also serve as a major driving force behind good collaboration 
(Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, p. 25). Given these factors, it is very likely that 
democratic pairings have a higher chance at good diplomatic relations than states that 
differ from regime type (Rummel, 1995, p. 474). To take this to the level of conflict 
in relation to regime type, the analysis of Benoit (1996, p. 654) has shown that two 
democracies were significantly less likely of having a dispute. These assumptions 
about bilateral relationships support the argument that democracies might digitally 
open up more to other democracies than to non-democracies.   
 Why would democracies then have a more cautious digital diplomatic strategy 
towards non-democracies? In their study on democracy and peace, Gleditsch and 
Hegre (1997, p. 286) found that “politically mixed dyads have a higher relative 
frequency of war than democratic dyads”. However, democracies are generally 
assumed to nurture tolerance, trust and negotiation and maintain friendships in the 
international system (Bennet, 2006; Benoit, 1996; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Yun, 
2005). They tend to maintain respectful relations and ensure world-wide peace, also 
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in an attempt to enjoy legitimacy (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 2004, p. 45). “Democracies 
share the norms of compromise, respect for different opinions and criticism 
(developed through the institutions and values of democracies)” (Bennet, 2006, p. 7). 
Accoring to Bennet (2006, p. 7), these shared norms and values may lower the 
probabilities of conflict. Numerous scholars in the realm of peaceful democracy 
studies agree with Bennet (2006), however they also express that non-democratic 
regimes do not share those values (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Gurevitch & Blumler, 
1990), probably causing democracies to be more careful in their relationship with 
non-democracies. Or as Bennet (2006, p. 7) states, democracies practice policies that 
avoid costly and unnecessary military competition. Gurevitch and Blumler (1990, p. 
25) elaborate on this with their claim that it is harder for democracies to conduct an 
honest and open online strategy when targeting a non-democratic country. Bjola and 
Holmes (2015, p. 76), for example, state that foreign diplomatic actors conducting 
digital diplomacy in a non-democracy must acknowledge the limits of what they can 
communicate publicly, otherwise severe consequences awaits them. These 
assumptions support the argument that democracies might be more cautious in their 
digital diplomatic strategies towards non-democracies, which could mean they might 
be less controversial in their Twitter-strategy when targeting an audience from a non-
democratic regime type.          
 All in all, democracies are more open and controversial in their relations with 
other democracies, but more cautious when practicing public diplomacy in non-
democracies. Digital diplomacy has given a new dimension to these existing bilateral 
relationships between countries in public diplomacy. Therefore, governments might 
adapt their online diplomatic strategies, when targeting audiences from distinctive 
regime types.  
 Altogether, these considerations suggest the following hypothesis: 	
H: Tweets sent by diplomatic actors will probably be less controversial	in a
 non-democratic country than in a democratic country.	
3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.1. Case Selection  
In this section will be given a justification for the case selection. This study will 
explore the tweets from the United Kingdom (henceforth referred to as the UK) and 
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the Netherlands. For each country separately, this study will compare the difference in 
its online strategy towards a democracy and a non-democracy. The UK and the 
Netherlands have been chosen due to four distinctive reasons. Firstly, they are 
experienced democracies. As this study seeks to explore whether democracies indeed 
apply different online strategies when targeting distinctive regime types, experienced 
democracies need to be analyzed. Semi-democracies like illiberal, partial, low 
intensity, empty democracies or hybrid regimes do not completely permit the 
expression of opposition in peaceful ways (Bennet, 2006, p. 7), so they are not 
relevant for this study. However, both the UK and the Netherlands have many 
diplomatic relations which they wish to maintain peacefully, and they have been 
doing so for many years according to their democratic norms and values. Second, 
both countries have well known advocacy campaigns. The digital developments in 
diplomacy opened up “new forms of engagement opportunities for Dutch 
transnational campaigning in favor of LGTB rights and UK actions aimed at the 
prevention of sexual violence” (Hocking & Melissen, 2015, p. 11). If I find out more 
on how the UK and the Netherlands conduct their well-known advocacy campaigns in 
non-democratic countries digitally, I could find out whether they are being more 
cautious targeting those countries or not. Third, they have multiple diplomatic actors 
with an active online presence on Twitter. In order to provide a larger image of a 
democracy’s digital diplomatic strategy towards distinctive regimes, I will focus on 
the Twitter accounts of multiple diplomatic actors from each the UK and the 
Netherlands, all in different ways but supposedly conducting the same strategy. 
Fourth, they are two different kinds of democracies, but equally democratic. I have 
chosen to use two democratic cases, because I want to be able to extend the outcome 
of this research on other democracies as well. Having chosen a global power like the 
United Kingdom and a relatively smaller democratic power like the Netherlands, will 
allow me to perhaps extend the outcome on both large and smaller democracies in the 
world.  
Moreover, former research on the use and effects of Twitter as a digital tool 
for governments practicing public diplomacy most often involve cases of Westernized 
countries. Those cases offer extensive research solely on digital diplomacy between 
Western countries. In an attempt to offer more completion to these studies, I have 
chosen to examine digital diplomatic strategies targeted at a non-democracy as well. 
As this study will examine the difference in online diplomatic strategies based on the 
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regime structure of the targeted country, the following cases are selected on their state 
structure. In order to determine if a country can be considered democratic or not, the 
Freedom House Index has been used. The Freedom House (2016) as a non-
governmental organization, works to defend human rights and promote democratic 
change conducted through advocacy and action. Canada is a country that is 
considered democratic, hence this country is selected as the democratic target country. 
In the Freedom House Index of 2015, Canada is given the status of a ‘free’ country in 
the world, with its civil and political rights ranked ‘most free’. On their website, the 
Freedom House (2015) mentions that Canada respects freedom of assembly and 
legally protects press freedom among other democratic values. More importantly, 
Canada is open and tolerant towards differences, opposition and criticism. As the non-
democratic country, also selected by using the Freedom House Index, China has been 
chosen. China, on the other hand, is given a status of ‘not free’ in the 2016 Freedom 
of the World report. This annual report on political rights and civil liberties highlights 
significant disputed territories around the world. Civil and political rights in China are 
ranked ‘least free’ (Puddington & Roylance, 2016, p. 20). Furthermore, in the report 
(2016) is mentioned that the Chinese government does not tolerate any opposition and 
the media environment is extremely restrictive, giving China a non-democratic status. 
More importantly, China is less tolerant towards differences and opposition. The 
different regime structure of Canada and China allows for comparison in this study, 
because both have peaceful diplomatic relations with the UK and the Netherlands. 
This means that the UK and the Netherlands conduct active foreign policy in both 
countries (Savun & Philips, 2009, p. 890). This is relevant simply because 
comparative research on online diplomatic strategies could not have been done if the 
UK and the Netherlands did not have active foreign policies for both targeted 
countries.  
3.2. Data Collection 
During the data-collection, the focus was on the Twitter accounts of multiple 
diplomatic actors from the UK and the Netherlands. The chosen British diplomatic 
actor targeting Canada is the account of the UK government called ‘@UKinCanada’. 
For targeting China, the British embassy in Beijing and the British consulate in 
HongKong were chosen. In Beijing, the British embassy is present on Twitter with an 
account called ‘@ukinchina’. The British consulate in HongKong has an account 
TWEETING FOR DEMOCRACY  14 
called ‘@UKinHongKong’. For the case of the Netherlands, the chosen Dutch 
diplomatic actors targeting Canada were the embassy in Ottowa and the consulate in 
Toronto. The Dutch embassy is present on Twitter with an account called 
‘@NLinCanada’ and the Dutch consulate has an account called ‘@NLinToronto’. For 
targeting China, the Dutch embassy in Bejijing and the Dutch consulate in HongKong 
were chosen. The former has a Twitter account called ‘@NLinChina’ and the latter 
has an account called ‘@NLinHongKong’. The analyzed timeframe for this study is 
exactly two months, running from the 1st of February 2016 until the 31st of March 
2016. As the area of studies of digital diplomacy is not older than the public use of the 
Internet and social media, studies with this topic are relatively new in academics and 
still require deeper analysis, this study included. However, with the use of the Internet 
changing so fast in the interconnected and interdependent world of today, the practice 
and conventions of digital diplomacy is also subject to change. For this reason, it is 
important to choose a timeframe as close as possible to the date of this study. For both 
the UK and the Netherlands, the chosen timeframe passed without any striking 
changes in their diplomatic relations with Canada and China. This allows me to 
explore whether democracies would adapt their online diplomatic strategies to the 
target audience when the relationship between the two countries are diplomatically 
“normal”. Or as better explained in the earlier sections, it is important that the UK and 
the Netherlands have the type of relationships with Canada and China that scholars 
would normally expect them to have. In this way, other circumstances like war and 
conflict would not be able to indirectly influence the outcome of this research.  
 The seven selected diplomatic actors use their Twitter accounts actively. 
‘@NLinCanada’ is the least active Twitter account in the given timeframe and 
‘@UKinCanada’ is the most active account. The least active account generates one 
tweet every week and the most active account generates two tweets per day, 
respectively. I have used Web Scraper (www.webscraper.io), an extension offered by 
Google Chrome, to retrieve the Tweets of the seven Twitter accounts. The company 
of Web Scraper advertises itself as specializing in data extraction from web pages, in 
this case, the web page of Twitter. Web Scraper automatically collects the data from 
Twitter that I have selected first. The idea is to manually make a slight selection of the 
type of data I would like to be collected, after which the system searches the rest of all 
the same data available on the webpage and collects it into one file. For example, I 
have been collecting data on account-name, date, actual text inside the tweet, tweeted 
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pictures, quoted tweets and links. I have done this for the actual tweets posted by the 
online diplomatic actors from the UK and the Netherlands. For all diplomatic actors, I 
made use of Twitter’s Advanced Search option. This option allowed me to search 
tweets based on date and account-name, which helped me find all the Tweets posted 
by the embassies within the given timeframe. This was a total of 124 for British actors 
targeting Canada, and a total of 105 for British actors targeting China. The total of 
tweets of Dutch diplomatic actors within the given timeframe was 68 for targeting 
Canada and a seemingly even total of 69 for targeting China.  
3.3. Data Coding and Analysis  
The main unit of analysis for the hypothesis is diplomatic tweets, which are any 
tweets posted by either the three British diplomatic accounts or the four Dutch 
accounts in February and March 2016. As I seek to understand the difference between 
diplomatic messages targeting distinctive audiences, I have left out any ‘Retweets’. 
‘Retweet’ is an option on the Twitter website that allows people to re-post tweets to 
their followers which were originally written by another account 
(support.twitter.com). Only self-generated Tweets are relevant for this study. For the 
comparative analysis regarding the hypothesis, the independent variable I looked at 
was the regime structure of the country which the diplomatic actors target in their 
tweets. Thus, the collected tweets were firstly hand coded either “democratic” or 
“non-democratic”. The dependent variable in the analysis was the controversy of the 
message in the diplomatic Tweets. For this I chose the most simplistic codes, either 
tweets collected were “controversial” or “neutral”. Based on the topic and word-
choice for the tweet, the messages delivered were either containing a ‘softer’ political 
message or a ‘harder’ one (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 78). Since controversy is not 
simple to define and interpret, a codebook was used which guided me throughout the 
coding of the data. “Controversial” tweets are tweets that addressed issues such as 
international politics, human rights, criticism towards foreign governments, 
international disputes, discrimination, internet freedom, sexuality, equality, women’s 
issues, ethnicity, climate security, proper governance, justice and wars. “Neutral” 
tweets were all other messages without a heated topic, like informative Tweets, 
‘thanking’ people or organizations, nation-branding, mentioning good trade relations, 
congratulating foreign audiences for national holidays and special birthdays, and 
mentioning good collaborations. For example, when The Dutch consulate in China 
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messaged that anti-discrimination legislation is necessary in China, now more than 
ever, this was branded “controversial”. When the same consulate informed the public 
that it is closed for passport and visa applications, the tweet was coded “neutral”.  
This study explores the relationship between the controversy in the tweets and the 
regime structure of the target country. For the statistical analysis, I have merged the 
tweets of the the two British actors targeting China, the tweets of the two Dutch actors 
targeting China and the tweets of the two Dutch actors targeting Canada. This choice 
was made, because the difference between strategies are examined and not the 
difference between various actors. 
3.4. Chi-Square Test, Qualitative Analysis and Variables  
Two Chi-Square Tests are used to analyze the difference in controversy in tweets 
posted by the diplomatic actors, one test for the British actors and one test for the 
Dutch actors. A Chi-Square Test is able to determine whether or not there is a 
statistical significant relationship between two variables (De Vocht, 2013, p. 149). I 
have done a separate test for each case in order to avoid finding differences between 
the British and Dutch actors, this could unintentionally influence the outcome. The 
Chi-Square Test was chosen as consistency test, because the two variables in this 
research are categorical and dichotomous. Since I only work with two categorical 
variables, I am analyzing a 2x2 table with the Fisher’s Exact Test. This test is able to 
determine the exact significance for 2x2 tables (De Vocht, 2013, p. 152). The binary 
independent variable I work with is regime structure, and is either 1 (democratic) or 0 
(non-democratic). The binary dependent variable controversy is able to test the 
hypothesis. Controversy is either a 1 (controversial) or a 0 (neutral). Furthermore, the 
outcome of the Chi-Square test is not able to determine the strength of the relation 
between the two variables. For that reason, I have run the Cramér’s V test to learn the 
strength of the association (De Vocht, 2013, p. 154). In order to provide a deeper 
understanding and interpretation of the outcome of the tests, I have combined this 
quantitative research with a systematic qualitative research. The qualitative analysis 
was able to help explain findings generated by the quantitative analysis (Bryman, 
2012, p. 633).  
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4. Findings 
Table 1 is a cross table which provides a summary of the count of tweets posted by 
the the diplomatic actors from the UK. As seen, the British diplomatic actors in 
Canada have jointly posted a higher total amount of tweets than the actors in China, 
though not drastically higher. However, the British actors in Canada and China jointly 
have quite an active presence on Twitter, with more than 100 tweets each within the 
two-month timeframe. Table 1 shows a very striking result when looking at the 
percentages; almost 25% of all the tweets targeted at China are controversial. To give 
a broader view, this means that approximately one out of every four tweets contained 
a controversial message. This percentage is surprisingly low for Canada; only 9% of 
all the tweets targeted at Canada address a controversial topic. These results evaluate 
that within the given timeframe, British diplomatic actors in China have jointly posted 
more controversial tweets than British diplomatic actors in Canada, respectively. This 
finding does not support the expectation that tweets targeted at a non-democratic 
country would probably be less controversial than tweets targeted at a democratic 
country. Table 1 shows that British diplomatic actors relatively post more messages 
with heated topics when targeting the audience in a non-democracy. 
 
Table 1: Cross table for the UK 
 
  Table 2 is a cross table providing a summary of the count of tweets posted by 
the diplomatic actors from the Netherlands. As seen in table 2, the amount of tweets 
posted by the Dutch diplomatic actors in Canada jointly is almost exactly the same as 
the amount of tweets posted by the actors in China, with a difference of one tweet. 
Both the actors in Canada and China jointly have quite an active Twitter presence, 
with almost 70 tweets each within the two-month timeframe. But more striking again 
are the percentages; almost 22% of all the tweets targeted at China are controversial. 
To give a broader view, this means that approximately one out of every five tweets 
 Canada China 
 Count % within regime structure Count % within regime structure 
neutral 113 91,1% 78 74,3% 
controversial 11 8,9% 27 25,7% 
total 124 tweets 105 tweets 
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address a heated topic. The same percentage is again, surprisingly low for Canada; 
only 6% of all the tweets targeted at Canada address a controversial topic. The 
findings for the Dutch diplomatic actors correspond with the findings for the British 
diplomatic actors and show that within the given timeframe, diplomatic actors have 
posted more controversial tweets in a non-democracy than in a democracy, 
respectively. Both the findings for the UK and the Netherlands cut against the 
hypothesis that tweets targeted at a non-democratic country would probably be less 
controversial than tweets targeted at a democracy. The results in both table 1 and table 
2 clearly show this might be otherwise.  
 
Table 2: Cross table for the Netherlands  
 
 
 Now that cross tables 1 and 2 have shown that the independent variable regime 
structure might not influence the dependent variable controversy in the way expected, 
tables 3 and 4 provide an overview of the significance of the relationship between the 
variables. Table 3 shows the outcome of the Pearson Chi-Square Test for the British 
diplomatic actors. As the two variables being scrutinized are both categorical, I work 
with a 2x2 cross table. Therefore, the Fisher’s Exact Test has determined the exact 
significance for the relation, which is 0,001. For the interpretation of this value, I 
maintain the 5-percent rule, meaning that any value lower than 0,05 indicates that two 
variables are very likely to have a significant relationship (De Vocht, 2013, p. 151).  
For the variables regime type and controversy, this is the case and therefore there is a 
clear significant relationship between them. Now that the relation is found to be 
significant, the Cramér’s V Test is able to determine the strength of the relationship, 
whether this association is strong or not. The value of this test is always between 0 
and 1, with 0 meaning there is no relationship and 1 meaning there is a perfect 
relationship (De Vocht, 2013, p. 154). As seen in table 3, the Cramér’s V value for the 
British diplomatic actors is 0,226. Accordingly, this value indicates that there is 
indeed a significant relationship, however, the relationship is not moderately strong. 
 Canada China 
 Count % within regime structure Count % within regime structure 
neutral 64   94,1% 54 78,3% 
controversial 4 5,9% 15 21,7% 
total 68 tweets 69 tweets 
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All in all, the outcomes of the test support the expectation that the regime structure of 
the target country could be influencing the controversy in the tweets generated by 
British diplomatic actors. 
 
Table 3: Chi-Square Test and Cramér’s V test for controversy of British tweets  
 Value Significance 
Pearson Chi-Square 11,654 - 
Fisher’s Exact Test - 0,001 
Cramér’s V 0,226 0,001 
 
  Table 3 shows the outcome of the Pearson Chi-Square Test for the Dutch 
diplomatic actors. Yet again, the Fisher’s Exact Test has determined the exact 
significance for the relation, which is 0,007. According to the 5-percent rule, this 
indicates a clear significant relationship between the variables in the Dutch case. The 
outcome of the Cramér’s V Test is 0,229, indicating a slightly stronger relationship 
between the variables for the Dutch case than for the British case. However, the 
relationship itself is still moderately strong.  
 
Table 4: Chi-Square Test and Cramér’s V test for controversy of Dutch tweets  
 Value Significance 
Pearson Chi-Square 7,209 - 
Fisher’s Exact Test - 0,007 
Cramér’s V 0,229 0,007 
5. Qualitative Analysis  
Altogether, the findings indicate that the regime structure of the target country does 
influence the message in the tweets of diplomatic actors, only not in the way 
described in the hypothesis. A closer look at the type of strategic tweets that the 
British and Dutch diplomatic actors generate might be able to give an explanation for 
this outcome. Overall, it could be stated that the British diplomatic actors are 
relatively more active in using their Twitter accounts for diplomatic strategies than 
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the Dutch actors. Nonetheless, the diplomatic actors from both countries tweeted 
more about controversial topics in China than in Canada. Furthermore, the topics 
which the diplomatic actors tweeted about targeting foreign audiences did not differ 
so much. For targeting Canada, the diplomatic actors from both the UK and the 
Netherlands addressed topics regarding nation-branding, society, culture and 
traditions. Regarding “neutral” topics in Canada, the British for example messaged 
about classical music, famous British scientists, Shakespeare and British-Canadian 
relations. The Dutch addressed “neutral” topics like art, fashion, Dutch-Canadian 
relations, Dutch innovations, water, tulips and wind turbines in Canada. Moreover, 
both British and Dutch diplomatic actors gave away funny facts about their countries 
and its inhabitants on Twitter. The British even formed these facts into a quiz for the 
online public, showing their willingness to engage with their Twitter audience. Also, 
the actors from both countries targeting Canada used their accounts to inform the 
public about closing-times of the embassies and consulates or giving away tips on 
visa/passport applications and travelling. The only “controversial” topics which both 
the British and Dutch diplomatic actors addressed when targeting Canada were human 
rights like anti-discrimination, freedoms and equality for all. For targeting China on 
the other hand, both the actors from the UK and the Netherlands addressed topics 
regarding democratic values, but also nation-branding and trade relations. For 
instance, The British addressed “neutral” topics in China like China’s new year, 
Easter celebrations, wildlife and British literature and science. Dutch diplomatic 
actors addressed “neutral” topics like new technologies, fashion, conferences, Dutch-
Chinese trade relations, art and literature. The “controversial” topics being addressed 
in the Dutch tweets were surprisingly corresponding with those of British diplomatic 
actors. When targeting China, the diplomatic actors from both the UK and the 
Netherlands mainly addressed different democratic values like civil right’s activism, 
social development, Internet freedom, climate security, proper governance, education, 
peace, international security issues and gender equality.     
 In comparison, diplomatic actors are willing to engage more different 
controversial topics targeting a non-democracy than targeting a democracy. However, 
the way in which they address controversial topics is different. For instance, 
diplomatic actors targeting Canada specifically name a case when they cover a 
controversial topic in their tweets. The diplomatic actors targeting China, on the other 
hand, do message about democratic values like human rights, but do not speak of any 
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case in specific in their tweets. Bjola and Holmes (2015, p. 6) explain this by stating 
that diplomatic actors have “creatively used social media to alleviate the suspicion of 
Chinese authorities”. In this way, diplomatic actors targeting China still cover topics 
hinting on democratic change for the Chinese, without directly criticizing the Chinese 
government and therefore, are avoiding any conflict. The most striking difference in 
the tweets which diplomatic actors generated when targeting distinctive audiences, 
was the way they handled International Women’s Day on March 8th 2016. This day is 
“an occasion for a sense of female consciousness and as sense of feminist 
internationalism” (Kaplan, 1985, p. 170), which contributes to world-wide women’s 
rights advocacy. On this specific day, the diplomatic actors targeting Canada only 
mentioned International Women’s day in a maximum of 2 tweets per actor. The 
diplomatic actors targeting China, on the other hand, have not only dedicated a 
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 tweets per actor to International Women’s Day, 
but also put in the effort to explain the importance of this day to their audience. This 
finding is a great example of the way diplomatic actors are actually more 
controversial targeting a non-democracy than targeting a democracy. Explanations for 
these findings can be found in the realm of democratic peace studies.    
 In their study on democratic peace, De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 
(1999, p. 4) give an institutional reasoning stating it is a tendency for democracies to 
initiate against autocracies. Other scholars explain that this is based on the democratic 
willingness to ‘sell’ the world their democratic values (Blanton, 2005). For example, 
Layne (1994, p. 8) claims that democracies are always seeking for more allies for the 
groundwork of a more democratic world. Studies confirm that democracies engage in 
friendly relations with non-democracies, but nevertheless feel the responsibility to 
publicly nurture democratic tolerance. Robinson (1996) calls this phenomenon 
‘democracy promotion’ in his study. According to Robinson (1996, p. 621), this 
promotion has been an integral component of a democracy’s foreign policy, since the 
worldwide wake of the defeat of fascism. “Democracy is a universal aspiration and 
the claim to promote it has mass appeal” (Robinson, 1996, p. 623). For example, the 
United States government has used a lot of democracy promotion in their diplomatic 
strategies to help transition authoritarianisms in the 1980s (Robinson, 1996, p. 652). 
Also in the spirit of neoliberalism, the US government found the opportunity to 
promote democratic values (Blanton, 2005, p. 648). As of today, the digitalization 
process of diplomatic practices might be a helping hand in this. As Åström et al. 
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(2012, p. 143) state in their article, the more vibrant the democratic practice is in 
using the Internet, the more vibrant the Internet will be used for political actions 
promoting democratic values. Promoting democracy is now also taken up in the 
public diplomatic strategies of democratic countries conducted through social media. 
Especially European countries have publicized the issue of promoting democracy in 
their diplomatic strategies (Olsen, 2000, p. 163). According to Olsen (2000, p. 143), 
democracies mainly address the prominent values of human rights and rule of law in 
their promotion of democracy. In their book on values and principles in European 
countries’ foreign politics, Lucarelli and Manners (2006, p. 128) mention that 
promoting human rights and democracy abroad is an important characteristic of 
European diplomatic strategies. Regarding the non-democracies of nowadays, 
European countries assumes that their promotion of democracy will work as it did 
with Eastern Europe (Lucarelli & Manners, 2006, p. 131). The claims of the scholars 
mentioned above indicate that democracies truly believe in spreading their democratic 
values and therefore, ‘helping’ non-democracies. This can be seen in the topics that 
diplomatic actors from the UK and the Netherlands mainly chose to tweet about when 
targeting China. Moreover, the claims indicate that when targeting another 
democracy, democracies find there is less need of controversy than in targeting a non-
democracy. The diplomatic actors from the UK and the Netherlands indeed chose to 
mainly tweet about neutral topics when targeting Canada. Accordingly, democracies 
feel less responsibility to promote democracy in a country which already nurtures 
democratic values.           
  
6. Discussion	
This study did an attempt to answer the following research question: Does the state 
structure of a target country influence the digital diplomatic strategies that 
government actors conduct through Twitter? As of today, existing research on digital 
diplomacy conducted through Twitter has been focused on explaining why and how 
government actors influence or should influence a foreign audience. Those studies 
tend to focus on government actors only by either looking at how state actors benefit 
from conducting public diplomacy through social media, or by looking at the best 
ways of communication which government actors could choose to interact with an 
online public. Although some scholars do mention that governments might apply 
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different online diplomatic strategies when targeting distinctive audiences, most 
scholars have not done further research to explain why and how these strategies might 
differ. Some studies, however, do indicate that the aspect of a target country like its 
regime structure might have an influence on digital diplomacy strategies. In order to 
fill this apparent gap in current literature, I involved studies on international relations, 
diplomatic relations and foreign policy literature outlining behavioral explanations. 
This research has found that there might be a difference in a government’s strategy 
targeting a democracy or a non-democracy. More specifically, democratic countries 
would be more cautious in their digital diplomatic strategies towards non-democracies 
than towards democracies, because non-democracies do not share their values like 
nurturing tolerance, differences and criticism. To elaborate on this, I chose to analyze 
the tweets of diplomatic actors from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for 
solid reasons described earlier. Eventually, I collected data on three British diplomatic 
actors and four Dutch diplomatic actors targeting Canada as a democratic target 
country and China as a non-democratic country. I have done two separate Chi-Square 
Tests, one for the British case and one for the Dutch case.  
  The findings of the tests surprisingly showed that the diplomatic actors from 
the UK and the Netherlands have posted more controversial tweets targeting a non-
democracy than targeting a democracy in the given timeframe of February and March 
2016. Furthermore, the relationship between the regime structure of the target country 
and the controversy in the tweets of the diplomatic actors seemed to be significant, 
though not very strong. As the findings of this quantitative research cut against the 
expectation given in the literature review, a systematic qualitative analysis was done 
to give an explanation for the outcome. This analysis showed that the controversial 
tweets targeted at China mostly issued democratic values, like human rights. Another 
striking finding was that although diplomatic actors targeting china were willing to 
talk about controversial topics, they would not name any case or issue in specific. 
Searching in the realm of democratic peace studies, some scholars might have given 
an explanation for this. They claim that democracies overall are eager to promote the 
democratic system and its values. Especially in their foreign policies towards non-
democracies, democracies feel like ‘helping’ them and therefore, spread their 
democratic values. Democracies find there is less need of controversy in another 
democracy, because they already nurture the values. These claims support the finding 
that diplomatic actors from the UK and the Netherlands addressed a lot of democratic 
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values in their controversial tweets towards China and overall were more 
controversial targeting China than targeting Canada. 
  In conclusion, the findings indicated that the regime structure of the target 
country does influence the message in the tweets of diplomatic actors, though not in 
the way expected. Tweets sent by diplomatic actors are actually more controversial	 in 
a non-democratic country than in a democratic country. As the findings cut against 
the expectation of the hypothesis, deeper analysis on behavioral explanations for 
online diplomatic strategies is required to offer more completion to this research. 
Moreover, the difference in online diplomatic strategies could be further examined by 
looking at other aspects of the target country, or even by looking at factors regarding 
the online public. By examining other cases of global and smaller democratic 
countries as well, this study could be given a deeper understanding. Any further 
understanding of this study could also include analyses of non-democratic cases 
conducting digital diplomatic strategies upon targeted democracies. These are tasks 
for future research. Lastly, future scholars should bear in mind that with the use of 
Internet changing so fast in the digitalized world of today, the practice of digital 
diplomacy could also change relatively quick. Therefore, this study might be outdated 
faster than expected. 
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